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CREDITORS AND THE FEME COVERT 
James Oldham* 
[Forthcoming, in Law and Legal Process, D. Ibbetson and M. Dyson eds. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013)] 
        
Introduction 
 
William Blackstone in his Commentaries explained that, ‘By marriage the husband and wife are one 
person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or 
is at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and 
cover she performs everything.’1 Despite this flat declaration, there was a steady stream of lawsuits 
against married women in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most of the cases were 
brought by tradesmen or merchants seeking payment for services rendered or goods sold. The typical 
contexts were two: when married women transacted business as if single, as femes sole, and when 
married women lived separate from their husbands and purchased goods or services for subsistence, 
as ‘necessaries’. 
Even when Blackstone wrote, exceptions to the ‘unity of the persons’ theory had been 
recognised. The established rules were summarised by De Grey CJCP in 1776 in the case of Hatchett 
v. Baddeley.2 The defendant had eloped from her husband and lived separate and apart from him; 
plaintiffs performed work for the defendant at her request and on her credit only. After stating the 
baseline rule with more specificity than did Blackstone,3 De Grey noted the existence of exceptions 
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1	  W.	  Blackstone,	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Laws	  of	  England	  (1765-­‐69),	  vol.	  I,	  430,	  citing	  Coke	  on	  Littleton	  112.	  	  
2	  2	  W.	  Bl.	  1079	  (1776).	   In	  Blackstone’s	  report	  of	   the	  case,	  De	  Grey	  CJ’s	  opinion	  occupies	  but	  a	  single	  printed	  
page.	  A	  manuscript	  copy	  of	  the	  case,	  however,	  contains	  a	  fuller	  report:	  Buller	  and	  East,	  ‘Manuscript	  Notes	  of	  
Cases	  1754-­‐1792’,	  Part	  II,	  Misc.	  MS	  97,	  Inner	  Temple	  Library,	  London,	  132.	  The	  quotations	  of	  De	  Grey’s	  opinion	  
in	  the	  text	  and	  footnotes	  that	  follow	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  manuscript	  report	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  	  	  
	  
3	  ‘It	  is	  a	  clear	  general	  rule	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  woman’s	  marriage	  is	  to	  divest	  her	  of	  her	  personal	  property,	  of	  all	  
power	  of	  contracting,	  and	  so	  of	  administering,	  or	  disposing	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  husband	  without	  his	  consent,	  
though	  she	  lives	  with	  him.	  The	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  this	  is,	  she	  cannot	  sue	  or	  be	  sued,	  for	  were	  she	  able	  
to	  sue	  or	  liable	  to	  be	  sued,	  this	  would	  imply	  civil	  contracts	  and	  engagements.’	  
2	  
for local customs, such as ‘the wife’s trading as feme sole in the City of London’.4 Also, the husband’s 
actions or circumstances could make the wife effectively a feme sole, as when the husband was exiled 
from or had abjured the realm; likewise when the husband was or became an alien enemy.5  
 De Grey then asked how the law stood if the couple became separated because of the acts of 
the wife. His first response was: 
If she voluntarily departs from him without his consent (not adulterously) it may be a breach 
of her moral duty, but the argument from thence that she contracts a new character, carries no 
conviction with it in my mind. This is no new ground of acquiring new rights. The coverture 
still remains. The husband’s rights over her person and property remain as before. Her 
incapacities and obligations continue. 
On the facts in Hatchett, the wife left her husband, though not adulterously, and the plaintiff knew this 
was so; thus: ‘He, trusting her in that at least immoral state, must stand to it, as if he had trusted a 
feme sole trader in London in a matter not in the way of her trade.’ The plaintiff’s claim, therefore, 
failed. 
Even clearer was the case of a wife who eloped with a lover – De Grey asked whether she had 
‘a power of revoking the consent of the husband and making herself a feme sole by a criminal act of 
adultery’? The answer was plainly ‘no’, since, ‘If she be an adulterous one, it is true that by the canon 
and common law she cannot have alimony in the husband’s life, nor by Westminster 2d dower after 
his death’. 6 De Grey then asked, ‘What then is to become of the wife? It is said she must starve. How 
so’? He was not moved by his rhetorical questions; rather, he thought: 
This difficulty of procuring credit will oblige women to their duty. The making the separation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  On	   this	   custom,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Jewson	   v.	  Read	   (1773)	   Lofft	   134.	   There	  was	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	  married	  women	  
trading	   as	   femes	   sole	   in	   medieval	   market	   towns.	   See	   sources	   cited	   at	   K.	   Pearlston,	   ‘Judging	   the	   Judges:	  
Mansfield	  and	  Kenyon	  on	  Coverture,’	  unpublished	  article,	  University	  of	  New	  Brunswick	  (2007),	  n.	  5,	  available	  
at:	  
http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/BLHC07/Pearlston%20Judging%20the%20Judges%20vers%203.3.pdf.	  
Last	  accessed	  3.11.2012	  
	  
5	  See	  Derry	  v.	  Duke	  of	  Mazarine	  (1697)	  1	  Ld	  Raym	  147,	  also	  reported	  as	  Dearly	  v.	  Duchess	  of	  Nazarine,	  1	  Salk	  
116,	  and	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Mazarine	  Case.	  Blackstone	  recognised	  ‘one	  case	  where	  the	  
wife	   shall	   sue	   and	   be	   sued	   as	   a	   feme	   sole,	   viz:	  where	   the	   husband	   has	   abjured	   the	   realm,	   or	   is	   banished’:	  
Blackstone,	  Commentaries,	  vol.	  1,	  431.	  
	  
6	  ‘Westminster	  2d’	  refers	  to	  the	  Statue	  of	  Westminster	  II,	  13	  Edw.	  1	  (1285).	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easy would only induce them to desert their husbands. There is therefore no force in the 
argument of the wife’s difficulty of procuring credit. Indeed, if her departure be adulterous, 
probably there is someone [who] will provide for her. 
De Grey CJ did acknowledge that a married woman ‘who quit [her husband] for his cruelty’ could 
retain rights to alimony and dower, perhaps implying that in such circumstances she might be 
independently credit-worthy. 
William Blackstone had been appointed to the Court of Common Pleas in 1770, where he 
served until his death a decade later. His views of the rights of married women remained fixed, and in 
the Hatchett case, he was ‘clearly of opinion, that in no case can any feme covert be sued alone, 
except in the known excepted cases of abjuration, exile, and the like; where the husband is considered 
as dead, and the woman as a widow or else as divorced a vinculo’.7 Blackstone added, for good 
measure, ‘The rules of law should not be broken through for the sake of tradesmen.’8 
 One situation recognised by the common law judges in the eighteenth century as analogous to 
a civil death was when the husband had been convicted of a felony and transported to the colonies for 
life. This was said to justify suit in England against the wife for her unpaid debts.9 In a trial on assize 
at Carlisle in 1768, Pearson v. Carruthers, Yates JKB extended the exception to a case of 
transportation for a term of years. The decision was not reported, but it became well known, because 
Yates privately canvassed the opinions of all the judges before giving his final decision. According to 
a manuscript report of Carruthers, the plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit against the defendant, 
who pleaded coverture, claiming ‘that her husband had been alive and in Cumberland within three 
months of the trial’.10 The plaintiff’s response was that the husband had been ‘convicted of a crime for 
which he had been transported, for a term of years not yet expired’. This was objected to by counsel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  2	  W.	  Bl.	  at	  1082,	  citing	  Coke	  on	  Littleton	  133.	  
	  	  
8	  Buller	  and	  East,	  Misc.	  MS	  97,	  141.	  	  
	  
9	  Lord	  Mansfield	   in	  the	  Ringsted	  case	  remarked	  that	  he	  had	  decided	  such	  a	  case	  at	  the	  Maidstone	  assizes:	  3	  
Doug	  at	  198.	  
	  
10	  Harvard	   Law	   School,	  MS	   4057,	   f.	   206,	   (1759-­‐68).	   All	   references	   in	   the	   printed	   reports	   to	   the	   case	   before	  
Yates	  J	  at	  the	  1768	  Carlisle	  assizes	  cite	  the	  case	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Sparrow	  v.	  Carruthers.	  From	  the	  descriptions,	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  the	  same	  case	  as	  that	  in	  the	  manuscript	  report	  under	  the	  name	  of	  Pearson	  v.	  Carruthers,	  or	  a	  
parallel	  case	  brought	  by	  a	  different	  creditor.	  	  
4	  
for the defendant, who argued ‘that the wife was not suable as a feme sole, notwithstanding her 
husband’s transportation, he being yet alive’. Yates J’s opinion was that ‘the circumstances of the case 
dissolved the wife’s incapacity to contract,’ but as a caution, he instructed that the verdict for the 
plaintiff was to be subject to the opinion of the Court of King’s Bench. Afterwards, Yates reported 
that, ‘the action being for a small sum, and the parties poor, he had not put them to the expence of 
arguing the point in court, but would take the opinion of the judges of B.R. upon it, out of court’. 
Later, he ‘declared that all the judges of England were of opinion that the action well lay’.11 
 
The Court of King's Bench, Mansfield CJ 
 
A foretaste of Lord Mansfield’s views on married women debtors came in a 1777 nisi prius case, 
Crompton v. Mackerill.12 There, the plaintiff sued a married woman for goods sold and delivered and 
work and labour performed in finishing and fitting up a house on St James Street. Lord Mansfield 
‘said that if a married woman was to pass as a single woman, he should have no doubt about the 
cause, for then she would not be permitted to say afterwards she was married, for that she would be a 
cheat’. In the case before him, however, it was proved that the plaintiff continued work after learning 
that the defendant was married, and thus he was not permitted to recover.  
 In the mid-1780s, a trilogy of cases brought on the full development of Lord Mansfield’s 
views on married women debtors. In Ringsted v. Lady Lanesborough,13 he repeated the fundamental 
rule that at common law, ‘a wife has no civil capacity or power of acting without her husband, under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Emphasis	  added.	  Apparently	  instead	  of	  approaching	  only	  King’s	  Bench	  judges,	  Yates	  J	  put	  the	  case	  informally	  
to	   the	   twelve	   judges	   at	   one	  of	   their	   periodic	   gatherings	   to	   consider	   questions	   reserved	   in	   crown	   cases	   and	  
some	  civil	  cases.	  On	  this	  procedure,	  see	  J.	  Oldham,	   ‘Informal	  Lawmaking	   in	  England	  by	  the	  Twelve	  Judges	   in	  
the	  Late	  Eighteenth	  and	  Early	  Nineteenth	  Centuries’	  (2011)	  29	  Law	  and	  History	  Review	  181.	  	  Yates’s	  poll	  of	  the	  
judges	  accounts	   for	   the	  recurrent	  references	  to	  the	  Carruthers	  case	   in	  other	  decisions	  even	  though	  the	  case	  
was	  never	  reported.	  See	  the	  reference	  by	  Lord	  Mansfield	  CJ	   in	  Ringsted	  v.	  Lanesborough	   (1783)	  3	  Doug	  197,	  
198;	  by	  Blackstone	  J	   in	  Lean	  v.	  Schutz	   (1783)	  1	  W	  Bl	  1195,	  1197;	  by	  barrister	  John	  Scott	  (later	  Lord	  Eldon)	   in	  
Corbett	   v.	  Poelnitz	   (1785)	  1	  TR	  5,	  6;	  by	  Buller	   J	   in	  De	  Gallion	   v.	  L’Aigle	   (1798)	  1	  B	  &	  P	  357;	  and	  by	  barrister	  
Edward	  Law	  (later	  Lord	  Loughborough)	  in	  Marshall	  v.	  Rutton,	  text	  at	  n.	  62,	  below.	  
	  
12	  Buller	  and	  East,	  ‘Manuscript	  Notes	  of	  Cases	  1754-­‐1792’,	  Part	  I,	  Misc.	  MS	  96,	  Inner	  Temple	  Library,	  London,	  
70,	  sittings	  after	  Michaelmas	  1777,	  Westminster	  Hall.	  	  
	  
13	  (1783)	  3	  Doug	  197.	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whose absolute controul she is supposed to be’.14 But he also noted the established exceptions–when 
the husband had abjured the realm, was exiled, was a foreigner living abroad as an alien enemy, or 
was transported out of the kingdom, even if only for a term of years. On the facts of Ringsted, it was 
but a small step to allow the plaintiff to recover. The defendant and her late husband (who died before 
the action was brought) lived apart, he in Ireland and she in England. She had subsisted ‘on ample 
separate maintenance’, and since her husband, when alive, was ‘not amenable to the process of the 
[English] courts’, Mansfield and his fellow King’s Bench judges thought that the case could be 
reasonably aligned with cases of abjuration and exile. He cautioned that ‘the opinion we give will turn 
on all the circumstances of the case taken together and what I say will only apply to a case situated 
exactly like the present’.15 Yet he also supported his holding in the case with the following comments:  
General rules are adapted to the frequent and ordinary state of the subject matter to which 
they relate, at the time when they are made. But in process of time, through the succession of 
ages, new manners arise, new modes of acting diversify the subject and beget cases within the 
letter but not within the reason of the general rule. Inconvenience, injustice and many 
absurdities must follow if the letter of a general rule was to govern cases not within the 
reason, & therefore exceptions are implied from time to time, as the cases fit to be excepted 
arise, & the exceptions form a system of law together with the rule.16 
 A year later in Barwell v. Brooks17, Lord Mansfield extended the Ringsted exception to an 
action against a feme covert for necessaries even though both parties resided in England. The husband 
and wife lived separately, and the wife received a competent separate maintenance that was regularly 
paid. Again, Mansfield said that, ‘modern fashions have altered the old law’, and ‘the courts have 
gone gradually for public convenience to enable women in these circumstances to carry on trade for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  quotation	  is	  taken	  from	  Mansfield’s	  handwritten	  opinion	  in	  the	  case,	  Scone	  Palace	  MSS	  First	  Series,	  Box	  
68.	   The	   autograph	  opinion	   contains	   a	   number	   of	   expressions	   omitted	   in	  Douglas’s	   report.	   It	   should	   also	   be	  
noted	   that	  Douglas’s	   report	   of	   the	   case	  was	   not	   printed	   until	   volumes	   three	   and	   four	   of	  Douglas’s	   Reports	  
were	  published	  by	  editor	  Henry	  Roscoe	  in	  1831.	  	  
	  
15	  3	  Doug	  at	  206.	  	  
	  
16	  Scone	  Palace	  MSS,	  First	  Series,	  Box	  68.	  	  
	  
17	  (1784)	  3	  Doug	  371.	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their support and to prevent their becoming common cheats’.18 The plaintiff also argued that the 
husband should be joined as a defendant, but Mansfield had ‘no difficulty in getting over that, 
notwithstanding the authority’.19 He said that, ‘nothing can be so extravagant as to say in this case the 
husband must be joined, merely that the plaintiff may be nonsuited, for it is admitted that he [the 
husband] is not liable’.20 
 Finally, in Corbett v. Poelnitz,21 Mansfield took the largest step of all, allowing a creditor to 
sue a married woman living separately from her husband by agreement and having a large separate 
maintenance, even though both parties lived in England and the action was not limited to necessaries. 
He said that the three cases – Ringsted, Barwell, and Corbett – were fundamentally governed by ‘the 
great principle which the Court has laid down, “that where a woman has a separate estate, and acts 
and receives credit as a feme sole, she shall be liable as such”’.22 
 The cases coming before the courts in the years that followed were varied, including more 
suits by creditors against married women who had behaved in the market place as if femes sole, and 
cases against husbands for necessaries extended to their wives.23 During 1787-8, Lord Mansfield was 
inactive due to failing health (though he survived until 1793), and Buller J was de facto chief justice. 
Buller continued to follow the line of cases that had culminated in Corbett v. Poelnitz. In Tunks v. 
Williams, the defendant and her husband lived separately and she had a separate maintenance; thus, as 
Buller told the jury, ‘she alone is liable to pay all the debts she may contract; so far solemn decisions 
declare’.24 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against Mrs Williams for £27, despite strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  quoted	   language	   is	   from	  a	  manuscript	   report	  of	   the	  Barwell	   case,	  Dampier	  Manuscripts,	   ‘Cases	   in	   the	  
King’s	  Bench,’	  vol.	  4,	  MS	  49,	  Middle	  Temple	  Library,	  London,	  68.	  	  
	  
19	  3	  Doug	  at	  373.	  	  
	  
20	  Dampier	  MSS	  4,	  68.	  	  
	  
21	  (1785)	  1	  TR	  5.	  	  
	  
22	  1	  TR	  at	  9.	  	  
	  
23	  For	  a	  categorisation	  of	  the	  cases,	  see	  the	  extensive	  footnote	  by	  editor	  Henry	  Roscoe	  following	  his	  report	  of	  
Ringsted	  in	  3	  Doug	  204.	  	  
	  
24	  The	  Times,	  September	  29	  1787,	  3.	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evidence that the couple had been reconciled.25 
 
Kenyon CJ and Coverture Resurgent 
 
As is well-known, the ‘great principle’ stated by Lord Mansfield in Corbett v. Poelnitz did not 
sit well with his successor, Lloyd Kenyon. In several cases during the 1790s, Kenyon showed 
dissatisfaction with the expansion of married women’s liability that Lord Mansfield had 
accomplished.26 In Gilchrist v. Brown,27 the King’s Bench rejected a suit by a creditor against a 
married woman ‘on promises on her own separate credit and account, in manner of a feme sole’. The 
defendant was separated from her husband, but the action could not be supported because it ‘was 
destitute of the principle upon which all the late decisions have proceeded; in which it has been held 
that a feme covert may be sued as a feme sole, namely, a separate maintenance’.28 
A separate question was what proof would be sufficient to establish the existence and 
continuation of a separate maintenance. In Stedman v. Gooch,29 Erskine, counsel for the plaintiff, 
offered proof of the Ecclesiastical Court’s sentence of separation, and the receipt by the defendant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  According	  to	  another	  report	  of	  the	  case	  in	  The	  Times,	  June	  20	  1787,	  3,	  the	  husband	  ‘frequently	  visited	  the	  
defendant,	  conversed	  with	  her	  in	  terms	  of	  familiarity,	  called	  her	  his	  dear	  and	  his	  dame,	  frequently	  dined	  and	  
supped	  in	  her	  company,	  .	  .	  .	  and	  went	  to	  her	  bed-­‐chamber	  at	  ten	  and	  eleven	  at	  night;	  but	  whether	  he	  lay	  there	  
or	  not	  was	  not	  proved,	  and	  it	  was	  admitted	  that	  she	  never	  went	  to	  his	  house’.	  	  
	  
26	  Ironically,	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  coverture	  cases	  to	  come	  before	  Lord	  Kenyon	  featured	  Lady	  Lanesborough,	  who	  
had	  been	  before	   Lord	  Mansfield	   in	   the	  Ringsted	   case.	  Ganer	   v.	  Lady	   Lanesborough	   (1790)	  Peake	  25,	   also	   in	  
manuscript	   notes	   in	   a	   book	   kept	   by	   Vicary	   Gibbs,	   ‘Cases	   at	   Nisi	   Prius	   1782-­‐1811’,	   MS	   17,	   Middle	   Temple	  
Library,	  London,	  f.77.	  Ganer	  brought	  an	  action	  of	  debt	  on	  a	  judgment,	  and	  Lady	  Lanesborough’s	  defence	  was	  
that	   she	  was	  married	   to	   John	  King.	  According	   to	   the	  Gibbs	  manuscript,	  Ganer	   replied	   that	  King,	  a	   Jew,	   ‘had	  
been	  before	  married	  to	  one	  Sara	  Lara,	  a	  Jewish	  woman’,	  and	  this	  was	  supported	  by	  testimony	  of	  the	  clerk	  of	  
the	   notary.	   The	   clerk	   had	   been	   at	   the	  wedding,	   and	   he	   said	   that	   it	   had	   been	   conducted	   ‘according	   to	   the	  
Jewish	  rites’.	  	  Peake’s	  report	  states	  that	  Lady	  Lanesborough	  and	  King	  ‘were	  divorced	  at	  Leghorn	  [Livorno,	  Italy]	  
according	  to	  the	  rites	  and	  customs	  of	  the	  Jews	  there’,	  and	  ‘she	  produced	  an	  instrument	  under	  the	  seal	  of	  the	  
synagogue	  there’.	  Lord	  Kenyon	  ‘held	  this	  to	  be	  no	  evidence,	  for	  before	  he	  could	  take	  notice	  of	  any	  proceeding	  
in	   a	   foreign	   Court,	   he	  must	   know	   the	   law	   of	   the	   country,	   which	  was	   a	  matter	   of	   evidence,	   and	   should	   be	  
proved	  by	  witnesses’,	  Peake	  at	  25-­‐26.	   	  Ultimately,	  Sara	  Lara	  was	  allowed	  to	  confirm	  the	  divorce	  by	  her	  own	  
testimony,	  over	  the	  objection	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  that	  Lara	  was	  not	  a	  competent	  witness.	  The	  jury	  verdict	  was	  for	  
the	  defendant.	  
	  
27	  (1792)	  4	  TR	  766.	  
	  
28	  4	  TR	  at	  766-­‐67.	  
	  
29	  (1793)	  1	  Esp	  3.	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from her husband of a regular annuity of £200 per annum payable at a London bank. At trial, 
according to Espinasse, Lord Kenyon seemed to think this proof sufficient, but the question was 
reserved for the full court. Espinasse ended his report by saying that when the case came on, ‘the 
other Judges seemed to concur in opinion with Lord Kenyon; but no judgment has been given’.30 In a 
subsequent report of the case in The Times, however, Kenyon mused that, ‘The loose manners of the 
present time had rendered cases of this kind more frequent’, and, ‘When it was said, that laws were to 
be framed according to the custom of the times, he was afraid that was a most dangerous proposition; 
who was to set the fashion – where were they to find it?’31 On the case before the court, he thought the 
annuity was ad arbitrium viri, something the husband could revoke at any moment, and without the 
security of a deed, the action would not lie. Grose and Ashhurst JJ agreed. Buller J disagreed, stating 
that ‘in conscience and justice’ the verdict should stand, and pointing out that when the £200 ‘was 
deposited in the hands of a Banker, who in this case was in the nature of a trustee for the next year’s 
maintenance, should the defendant not be liable to pay the debts she contracts during that year?’32 
In 1794 in Ellah v. Leigh33 the plaintiff creditor answered the defendant’s plea of coverture by 
explaining ‘that the defendant was separated from her husband, that alimony was allowed her by the 
Ecclesiastical Court pending a suit there, which was a sufficient maintenance, and that she obtained 
credit and made the promises on her own account as a feme sole and not on the credit of her husband’. 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the case came within the reason of Corbett v. Poelnitz, but to no 
avail. Clearly in direct response to the view expressed by Lord Mansfield in the Ringsted and Corbett 
cases, Lord Kenyon declared: ‘I do not think that the courts ought to change the law so as to adapt it 
to the fashion of the times: if an alteration in the law be necessary, recourse must be had to the 
Legislature for it’.34 Kenyon acknowledged that Corbett ‘was indeed decided by great authority; and 
when a similar question arises, perhaps it may influence my judgment: but until such a case does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.	  at	  8.	  
	  
31	  The	  Times,	  15	  June	  1793,	  3.	  
	  
32	  Ibid.	  
	  
33	  (1794)	  5	  TR	  679.	  
	  
34	  5	  TR	  at	  682.	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arise, I shall suspend my opinion upon it’.35 But in the case at bar, analogous to the Stedman case, the 
wife’s right to alimony during the pendency of the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court was not enough to 
constitute a separate maintenance; thus, the defendant’s plea of coverture was upheld. 
 Two years later in Clayton v. Adams,36 the Court of King’s Bench again faced the coverture 
issue, this time in a suit by a creditor against the married woman’s executor. Clayton claimed that the 
deceased ‘carried on the trade and business of a haberdasher as a feme sole’, and that he knew nothing 
of any husband. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that, according to Ellah and other cases, the 
plaintiff could not have recovered against the testatrix herself, but argued that the defendant was liable 
as her executor, citing cases from the Court of Chancery. Without bothering to hear from the 
defendant’s counsel, Lord Kenyon said that he fully subscribed to the equity cases, but a court of 
equity ‘can give relief where a court of law cannot’. He stated that, ‘A court of law cannot get at the 
property of the wife, if she have any’, and ‘if any one proposition in the law can be more clear than 
another it is this, that an action cannot be brought against a feme covert except by the custom of 
London’. Again alluding to Mansfield’s views, he added: ‘We must not, by any whimsical conceits 
supposed to be adapted to the altering fashions of the times, overturn the established law of the land: it 
descended to us as a sacred charge, and it is our duty to preserve it’.37  
 Lord Kenyon was less sure of himself when the husband was out of the country. In 1797 in 
two suits brought against the Duchess of Pienne, he was willing to allow creditors to sue the 
defendant when her husband (a foreigner) had gone abroad and had stayed away for several years.38 In 
the first of these, Walford v. Duchess of Pienne, Kenyon was pragmatic, saying that since the husband 
had deserted the kingdom, was no longer domiciled in England, and had been gone for years, the wife 
‘might be starved’ if she could not be held liable for her debts because otherwise she would not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Ibid.	  
	  
36	  (1796)	  6	  TR	  604.	  	  
	  
37	  6	  T.R.	  at	  605.	  Lawrence	   J	   in	  his	  manuscript	  notes	  of	   the	  case	  quotes	  Lord	  Kenyon	  as	  declaring,	   succinctly:	  
‘The	   law	  protects	  us,	  and	  we	  ought	  to	  protect	   it’.	  Dampier	  Manuscripts,	   ‘Lawrence	  Paper	  Book	  (“LPB”)	  107’,	  
Lincoln’s	  Inn	  Library,	  London.	  	  
	  
38	  See	  Walford	  v.	  Duchess	  of	  Pienne	  (1797)	  2	  Esp	  554;	  Franks	  v.	  Duchess	  of	  Pienne	  (1797)	  2	  Esp	  587.	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credit-worthy.39 According to The Times, Kenyon also said that there was no hope of the Duke’s 
return, even though Espinasse reported that the plaintiff’s witness believed the Duke had not 
abandoned his intention to return.40 
 Despite the outcome in the Duchess of Pienne cases, Lord Kenyon commented ‘that some 
modern cases had, in his opinion, gone too far’.41  Clearly he was hoping for an opportunity that 
would allow the judges to reassess the tangled mass of decisions involving creditors who did business 
with femes covert. Such an opportunity arrived in Marshall v. Rutton. The case was argued twice 
before eleven of the twelve judges – first on 9 May 1798 before all the justices except Perryn B, and 
again on 10 May1800 before all the justices except Buller J. The action was brought in assumpsit on 
the common counts for goods sold, money laid out, and work performed for the defendant, who 
pleaded her coverture. The plaintiff replied that the defendant and her husband had mutually 
covenanted and agreed to live separate and apart, and that a competent separate maintenance of £200 
per annum had been secured to the defendant by deed and had been duly paid to her.  
 The report of the Marshall case published by Durnford and East in the Term Reports is 
relatively brief, containing only Lord Kenyon’s judgment. According to that report, Kenyon described 
the general question as ‘whether by any agreement between a man and his wife, she may be made 
legally responsible for the contracts she may enter into, and be liable to the actions of those who may 
have trusted to her engagements, as if she were sole and unmarried’.42 He then stated that, after two 
arguments before all the judges, ‘and after a very full consideration, the opinion of all the judges who 
heard the last argument is, that this action cannot be supported’. He tipped his hand early in his 
opinion by stating that the agreement between husband and wife to live separate and apart from each 
other was ‘a contract supposed to be made between two parties, who according to the text of Littleton, 
s. 168, being in law but one person, are on that account unable to contract with each other; and if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  2	   Esp	   554.	   Likewise	   in	   Franks	   v.	  Duchess	   of	   Pienne,	   Lord	   Kenyon	   reportedly	   said	   that	   the	   Duchess	   ‘must	  
either	  have	  credit,	  or	  be	  starved’.	  The	  Times,	  17	  November	  1797,	  3.	  
	  
40	  The	  Times,	  5	  August	  1797,	  4;	  2	  Esp	  554.	  
	  
41	  2	  Esp	  555.	  
	  
42	  8	  TR	  at	  546.	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foundation fail, the consequence is, that the whole superstructure must also fail’.43 He said this would 
introduce ‘all the confusion and inconvenience which must necessarily result from so anomalous and 
mixed a character’, and he listed a series of questions that would naturally follow if the plaintiff’s 
argument were to succeed. He claimed that the plaintiff’s argument rested only on the simple 
proposition ‘that where the husband ceases to be the protector of his wife, and is not liable to have any 
claim made on him for her support and maintenance, it necessarily follows that she herself must be 
her own protectress, make contracts for herself, and be responsible for them’.44  
 Kenyon, having served as Master of the Rolls in Chancery before becoming Chief Justice of 
King’s Bench, acknowledged that a feme covert could protect property to her separate use with a trust, 
and that courts of equity took notice of such trusts. Trusts, however, were not the province of courts of 
law. In the law courts, the ‘unity of the persons’ theory remained the rule, though a limited number of 
exceptions had crept in. Kenyon mentioned, for example, the situation ‘of the husband being 
considered as dead, and the woman as being in a state of widowhood, or as divorced a vinculo 
matrimonii’. But Kenyon also referred to ‘the cases of Ringsted v. Lady Lanesborough, Barwell v. 
Brooks, and some subsequent cases, which we wished to have reconsidered’.45 
 Lawrence J’s Paper Book for Marshall v. Rutton survives in Lincoln’s Inn Library, and it 
contains extensive notes of the two arguments before all the judges.46 The notes allow us to see 
something of a sea change in judicial attitudes. Certainly the driving force behind the ultimate 
outcome in Marshall v. Rutton was Lord Kenyon, but he was aided by fortuitous alterations in the 
composition of the courts. When the case was first argued in May 1798, two of the justices who had 
voted with Lord Mansfield in the Ringsted, Corbett, and Barwell cases were still serving – Ashhurst J 
in King’s Bench and Buller J, formerly in King’s Bench but who in 1794 had transferred to the Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Ibid.	  
	  
44	  Ibid.	  at	  547.	  
	  
45	  Ibid.	  at	  548.	  	  
	  
46	  Dampier	  MSS,	   LPB	  329,	   Lincoln’s	   Inn	   Library,	   London.	  Unless	   otherwise	   indicated,	   all	   quotations	   from	   the	  
arguments	  of	  counsel	  and	  comments	  or	  speeches	  by	  the	  judges	  during	  the	  two	  arguments	  in	  the	  Marshall	  case	  
are	  taken	  from	  Lawrence	  J’s	  handwritten	  notes	  in	  the	  margins	  and	  on	  the	  reverse	  sides	  of	  the	  pages	  of	  his	  copy	  
of	  the	  Paper	  Book.	  The	  full	  text	  of	  LPB	  329	  is	  available	  at	  J.	  Oldham	  (ed.),	  Case-­‐Notes	  of	  Sir	  Soulden	  Lawrence	  
1787-­‐1800	  (Selden	  Society,	  forthcoming	  2013),	  Part	  III.	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of Common Pleas. By the time the second argument was held two years later, Ashhurst J had resigned 
and Buller J was in failing health (he died a month after the second argument, which he did not 
attend). Also, Eyre CJ of the Court of Common Pleas, who attended the first argument, died in July 
1799 and was replaced by the former Attorney General, Sir John Scott, newly created Lord Eldon.  
 At the first argument, the plaintiff was represented by Josiah-Iles Wathen; the defendant by 
Stephen Gaselee. Wathen cited most of the cases that have been discussed, relying especially on 
Barwell and Corbett. Gaselee, in response, questioned whether the facts of Marshall fell within the 
authority of the cases that were cited, pointing out that it was not within a married woman’s power by 
her own acts to dissolve the civil contract of marriage, and that she could not bring suit by herself. 
Buller J at this point interjected: ‘That depends on the custom of London not extending to the courts 
of Westminster.’ 
 Lord Kenyon then distinguished the various authorities. He said that in the Duchess of 
Mazarine Case, ‘the party was not in the country and was an alien [enemy] and therefore the law 
could take no notice of him’. As to his own decision in Franks v. Duchess of Pienne, ‘There it was 
impossible to sue the husband and the purposes of justice required that there should be somebody 
sued’. Kenyon pointed out that in Ringsted, Lord Lanesborough was not in England, and Barwell v. 
Brooks involved ‘nothing like a permanent fund’. Further, Kenyon claimed that Barwell had been 
‘overruled by Ellah v. Leah and Clayton v. Adams’. With regard to Corbett v. Poelnitz, Kenyon said 
that the first principle (that since the husband was not liable, the wife must be) would not hold, and 
the other principle that referred to the case of Govier v. Hancock47 was ‘not decent for me to discuss’ 
(it dealt with adultery).48 Kenyon remarked that some of the old law was ‘very immoral’–it ‘prevents 
the breach between husband and wife being healed’. The last observations from the bench recorded by 
Lawrence J for the May 1798 argument were the following weary remarks by Eyre CJ: ‘I feel more 
difficulty from the authorities than from the principles. They [the principles] are with Lord Kenyon. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  (1796)	  6	  TR	  603.	  
	  
48	  On	  the	  Govier	  case,	  see	  text	  accompanying	  nn.	  103-­‐6,	  below.	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do not know what to do with the authorities’.49  
While the Marshall case was pending, at least four new cases dealing with creditors seeking 
to recover debts incurred by married women came before the common law courts. Two of the actions, 
one in the King’s Bench and the other in the Common Pleas, were against the same defendant, Sophia 
Harris, who went by the name of Mrs Kitchen. Years earlier she had married John Wells, but for the 
past four or five years, she had been living with Mr Kitchen as his mistress, though passing as his 
wife. In the first of the two cases, Cox v. Kitchen,50 the jury verdict in the Common Pleas was for the 
plaintiff, conforming to the instructions of the trial judge, Rooke J, who told the jury that because the 
defendant’s husband could not be liable (since his wife was living in a state of open adultery51), the 
wife must be liable herself. Relying on the Gilchrist case,52 Serjeant Williams filed a motion to set 
aside the verdict, but the full Court of Common Pleas upheld the jury verdict.53 Buller J (a Common 
Pleas justice since 1794) said that motions for new trials were governed by the court’s discretion to do 
justice without any necessity to ‘nicely examine whether the defendant be strictly liable in point of 
law’.54 And since the husband was not liable, the wife must be, else ‘she stands in a most miserable 
condition’ – ‘she can obtain no credit unless she be liable for her debt’. Heath and Rooke JJ 
concurred. 
Three months later the case of Ciron v. Kitchen came before the Court of King’s Bench on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Eyre	  CJ’s	  discomfort	  with	  the	  principles	  had,	   in	  fact,	  been	  clearly	  revealed	  to	  the	  practising	  bar	   in	  
the	   summer	   of	   1788	   in	   an	   unreported	   case	   heard	   at	   the	   Devon	   assizes.	   	   In	  Harris	   v.	   Pyne,	   the	   issue	   was,	  
‘whether	  a	   feme	  covert	   separated	   from	  her	  husband	  can	  maintain	   trover	  against	  a	   carrier	   for	  goods	  by	  him	  
delivered	  to	  the	  husband’.	  Dampier	  Manuscripts,	  Dampier	  Briefs,	  brief	  no.	  VIII,	  Lincoln’s	   Inn	  Library,	  London.	  
See	  the	  Appendix	   for	   the	   facts	  of	   the	  case	  and	  for	  Eyre	  CJ’s	  opinion.	  As	   is	   there	  shown,	  Eyre,	  even	  by	  1788,	  
thought	   that	   the	   cases	  might	   have	   gone	   too	   far,	   and	   he	  worried	   that	   he	   could	   not	   see	   a	   sensible	   stopping	  
place.	  He	  said	  that	  he	  would	  be	  sorry	  to	  lay	  down	  a	  rule	  that	  would	  facilitate	  married	  women	  living	  separately.	  
He	   acknowledged	   also	   that	   he	   did	   not	   think	   that,	   without	   trustees,	   an	   agreement	   before	   marriage	   could	  
enable	  a	  woman	  to	  hold	  her	  property	  separately.	  
50	  (1798)	  1	  B	  &	  338.	  
	  
51	  See	  below,	  text	  at	  nn.	  102-­‐9.	  
	  
52	  Text	  following	  n.	  102,	  below.	  
	  
53	  1	  B.	  &	  P	  at	  339-­‐40.	  
	  
54	  Ibid.	  at	  339.	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the same facts except for the identity of the creditor-plaintiff and the amount of the debt.55 Garrow, 
counsel for the plaintiff, immediately relied on the Cox decision that had issued from Common Pleas. 
Erskine, counsel for the defendant, argued that merely because the husband was not liable, it did not 
follow that the wife must be. He claimed that the Cox decision was ‘contrary to law’. Lord Kenyon 
said that he ‘certainly was fettered in such a way, that he could not possibly accede to the opinion 
given in the Court of Common Pleas’. He agreed with Erskine that the Cox case was ‘contrary to law’, 
and he ‘rested on the case which was to be decided in the Exchequer Chamber [Marshall v. Rutton]’. 
He ‘was confident that no new fashion of the times could alter the law of the land’. A jury verdict for 
£16.16s. was taken, subject to the anticipated opinion in Marshall.  
 Another case that came before the Court of Common Pleas while Marshall v. Rutton was 
pending was De Gaillon v. L’Aigle.56 The defendant pleaded coverture to the plaintiff’s suit in 
assumpsit on the common money counts. The defendant’s husband was shown to be a resident of 
Hamburg, and the plaintiff claimed to have dealt with the defendant as a feme sole. Serjeant 
Runnington in argument for the plaintiff distinguished the case from Ringsted and Barwell on the 
basis that the defendant’s separation from her husband was only temporary. Runnington argued that 
otherwise, if the court were ‘to determine that the mere circumstance of the husband being out of the 
kingdom makes the wife liable, a feme covert may be subjected to an execution by her husband 
quitting the kingdom at a moment’s warning’.57 Without allowing Serjeant Marshall to respond for the 
defendant, Buller J invoked ‘another set of cases of a very different nature’, namely, those in which 
the husband had been banished from England (Lady Belknap’s Case58) or had been transported 
(Carruthers), so that the disability of the wife was suspended. Buller concluded that in the case before 
the court, the husband had voluntarily abandoned his wife, never was in England, and perhaps might 
never come there. He therefore ruled that, ‘the wife has traded as a feme sole, has obtained credit as 
such, and ought to be liable for her debts’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  See	  The	  Times,	  16	  February	  1799.	  
	  
56	  (1798)	  1	  B	  &	  P	  357.	  	  
	  
57	  Ibid.	  at	  358.	  
	  
58	  Coke	  on	  Littleton,	  132b.	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 The remaining case to come before the common law courts while Marshall v. Rutton was 
being decided was Marsh v. Hutchinson,59 arising in the Court of Common Pleas after Lord Eldon had 
become Chief Justice. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for the price of coals supplied during the 
previous three or four years, and the defendant pleaded coverture. Her husband had been in the British 
diplomatic service, and after that employment ceased, he settled in Holland. The case was suspended 
until Marshall v. Rutton was finally decided,60  
 Thus by the time the second argument before all the judges in Marshall took place on 10 May 
1800, the plaintiff’s position had grown precarious. Ashhurst JKB had resigned, Eyre CJCP had died 
and been replaced by Lord Eldon, and Buller JCP was too ill to participate. Morever the plaintiff’s 
new counsel, Edward Law, was an unfortunate choice. Law later (in 1802) became Lord Ellenborough 
and succeeded Kenyon as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench.  According to Sir William 
Holdsworth, Ellenborough’s fundamental belief was ‘that in a changing age it was possible to stand 
obstinately on the ancient ways’ and to stand in ‘opposition to all the changes in the law which new 
ideas and new conditions were making necessary’.61 It is clear from the colloquies between Law and 
the judges that Law did not have his heart in the case. 
 Law began with the basic argument that, ‘if a woman [is] living separate from her husband 
having a competent maintenance for life defeasible by no act of the husband, and not defeated by any 
act of her own, [she] is capable of being sued as a feme sole’. Lord Eldon asked, ‘But how is the deed 
valid that puts her in that state of separation’? Law responded: ‘I can’t find anything in the books as to 
that last point, but I find from the authority of the books that this separation is taken notice of in our 
courts and in the Court of Chancery’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  (1800)	  2	  B	  &	  P	  226.	  	  
	  
60	  The	  report	  of	  the	  case	  by	  Bosanquet	  and	  Puller	   is	  dated	  21	  June	  1800,	  but	  the	  case	  was	  heard	  before	  the	  
second	   argument	   in	   Marshall	   v.	   Rutton	   on	   10	   May	   1800.	   Near	   the	   end	   of	   the	   printed	   report	   (at	   233),	  
Bosanquet	  and	  Puller	  state:	  ‘As	  the	  case	  of	  Marshall	  v.	  Mary	  Rutton,	  8	  TR	  545,	  in	  which	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  
the	  whole	   doctrine	   respecting	   the	   liability	   of	   a	   feme	   covert	   to	   be	   sued	  would	   be	   fully	   discussed,	  was	   then	  
pending	   before	   the	   twelve	   judges,	   the	   Court	   desired	   that	   this	   case	   might	   stand	   over	   until	   that	   had	   been	  
determined’.	   Lord	   Eldon	   had	   become	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Common	   Pleas	   in	   July	   1799,	   and	   after	   the	  Marshall	  
decision	  issued,	  the	  court	  in	  the	  Marsh	  case	  affirmed	  the	  trial	  judge’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  defendant’s	  claim	  of	  
coverture	  was	  valid.	  	  
	  
61	  W.	  S.	  Holdsworth,	  History	  of	  English	  Law	  (London:	  Methuen,	  1952),	  vol.	  13,	  503.	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 After further questioning by both Lord Eldon and Lord Kenyon, Law began to retreat. He 
stated: ‘I consider Ringsted v. Lady Lanesborough, &c. as modern revision and therefore do not press 
them. . . . And if I can’t contend that when the husband is not liable the wife is, I can’t succeed’. 
Later, citing both Lord Coke and the Carruthers case62, Law declared: 
The effect I contend for at law is that which the courts have given in the cases alluded to and 
what the courts of equity have given. . . . Coke [on] Littleton 668 shows that the wife may 
come in if the husband does not protect her rights. I stand here for a principle. I admit this is 
not within the cases. If the principle that the husband not being liable is not a ground to 
charge the wife, I have no pretension to trouble the Court.  
  After the arguments were concluded by Law for the plaintiff and Serjeant Bayley for the 
defendant, Lord Kenyon reviewed the authorities once more, and gave the following unsurprising 
summary appraisal: ‘I was never satisfied and therefore I wish[ed] this case should come to take away 
all difficulties. I have never had but one opinion about it’. 
It was unclear, nevertheless, whether in Marshall the Court of King’s Bench had overruled 
not only those cases where the husband and wife lived separately in England (Barwell, Corbett) but 
also those where the husband was out of the country (Ringsted, and the cases against the Duchess of 
Pienne).63 Arguably the principle of Ringsted survived whenever the husband was out of the country 
in circumstances that could be said to approximate ‘civil death’ – exile, abjuration, transportation for 
life; even, perhaps, transportation for a term of years.64 But the husband’s residency abroad, without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  In	  response	  to	  Law’s	  citation	  of	  Carruthers,	  Lord	  Kenyon	  interjected:	  ‘That	  was	  but	  a	  nisi	  prius	  case	  and	  then	  
the	  party	   could	  not	   come	  back	  during	   the	   seven	   years’.	   Kenyon	   failed	   to	  mention	   that	   Yates	  had	   taken	   the	  
opinion	  of	  all	  of	  the	  judges	  in	  the	  Carruthers	  case.	  	  
	  
63	  Henry	  Roscoe,	  in	  his	  editorial	  commentary	  in	  1831	  on	  the	  Ringsted	  case	  in	  volume	  three	  of	  Douglas’	  Reports,	  
opened	  his	   comments	  with	   the	   following:	   ‘Although	   this	   case	  came	  under	   the	  consideration	  of	   the	  Court	  of	  
King’s	  Bench,	   in	  Marshall	  v.	  Rutton,	  8	  T.R.	  554,	  by	  which	  it	  is	  generally	  supposed	  to	  have	  been	  overruled,	  yet	  
that	  consequence	  does	  not	  appear	  necessarily	  to	  follow;	  for	  in	  Marshall	  v.	  Rutton	  there	  was	  no	  averment	  that	  
the	  husband	  resided	  out	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  English	  courts,	  as	  in	  the	  principal	  case’:	  3	  Doug	  204.	  	  	  
	  
64	  In	  Carrol	  v.	  Blencow	  (1801)	  4	  Esp	  27,	  an	  action	  in	  assumpsit	  was	  brought	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Common	  Pleas	  for	  
goods	  sold	  and	  delivered.	  The	  defendant’s	  husband	  had	  been	  transported	  for	  seven	  years,	  but	  the	  seven	  years	  
had	  expired,	  and	  the	  plaintiff’s	  counsel	   therefore	  argued	  that	   the	  defendant’s	  claim	  of	  coverture	  should	  not	  
succeed.	  Richard	  Pepper	  Arden,	  created	  Lord	  Alvanley,	  had	  succeeded	  Lord	  Eldon	  as	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Court	  
of	  Common	  Pleas	  on	  22	  May	  1801.	  He	  rejected	  the	  plaintiff’s	  argument,	  holding	  that	  the	  defendant’s	  husband	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more, would not do, as had been demonstrated by the outcome (though without a final opinion) in 
Marsh v. Hutchinsin when Lord Eldon was Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Several years later the 
case of Farrer v. Granard65 came before the Common Pleas, in which the defendant pleaded 
coverture. The plaintiff replied that defendant’s husband lived in Ireland, and the defendant lived in 
England as a single woman, in which capacity she had promised to pay. Sir James Mansfield, who 
had been appointed Chief Justice of the Common Pleas less than two months before the case was 
argued,66 rejected the plaintiff’s claim, stating: ‘The terms of the replication are perfectly consistent 
with a mere temporary absence. They might be applied to the case of every man who goes for a short 
time to live in Ireland or Scotland, and whose wife in the meantime contracts debts here’.67  
 Similarly, in Boggett v. Frier,68 the Court of King’s Bench upheld the defence of coverture 
even though the defendant’s husband ‘had four years before deserted her and gone beyond seas 
without leaving her any means of support, and . . . had not since been heard of by her’. The court 
under Ellenborough CJ said that the cases cited by the plaintiff ‘were antecedent to that of Marshall v. 
Rutton; and, so far as they were opposed to [it], were overruled by that decision, which restored what 
was the old established rule of law, founded generally upon the relation of husband and wife, by 
which, with certain known specific exceptions, no married woman was capable of contracting or 
acting as a feme sole, or of suing or being sued as such’.69 
 Finally, before turning to the question of ‘necessaries’, it is worth noting that the Court of 
King’s Bench faced once more the Duchess of Pienne, who had ducked for cover yet again behind her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
had	   effectively	   abjured	   the	   realm	   after	   his	   term	   of	   transportation	   had	   ended.	   No	   reference	   appears	   in	  
Espinasse’s	  report	  of	  the	  case	  to	  either	  Marshall	  v.	  Rutton	  or	  Marsh	  v.	  Hutchinson.	  	  
	  
65	  (1804)	  1	  B	  &	  P	  NR	  80.	  	  
	  
66	  Sir	  James	  Mansfield	  took	  office	  as	  Chief	  Justice	  on	  24	  April	  1804	  after	  Chief	  Justice	  Alvanley	  had	  died	  on	  19	  
March.	  
	  
67	  Ibid.	  at	  81.	  Serjeant	  Best	  had	  cited	  the	  case	  of	  De	  Gaillon	  v.	  L’Aigle	  on	  the	  plaintiff’s	  behalf,	  but	  Heath	  J	  said	  
that	  the	  De	  Gaillon	  case	  ‘proceeded	  much	  upon	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  Defendant’s	  husband	  being	  a	  foreigner’.	  See	  
text	  at	  nn.	  56-­‐8,	  above.	  	  
	  
68	  (1809)	  11	  East	  301.	  	  
	  
69	  Ibid.	  at	  303.	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absent husband. In Kay v. de Pienne,70 the Duchess was sued on a promissory note. Her husband had 
returned to England from France sometime after the first round of litigation in 1797.71 The Duke, 
however, had decamped again, this time in 1803 ‘to enter into the service of Sweden’.72 Garrow, for 
the plaintiff, relied on Lord Kenyon’s earlier decisions upholding jury verdicts against the Duchess, as 
if a feme sole. Ellenborough CJ was unreceptive. He said he did not know whether Lord Kenyon had 
realised that the Duke had been living with his wife in England before returning to France. If so, said 
Ellenborough, ‘I cannot subscribe to his opinion’, and in any case, the Ringsted and Corbett decisions 
had not then been judicially overturned. Ellenborough said that, ‘Since the case of Marshall v. Rutton 
. . . which restored the old common law upon this subject, I consider it quite clear that a married 
woman, under the circumstances of the present defendant, is not liable to be sued as a feme sole’.73 
According to The Times, a nonsuit was entered at Garrow’s request.74 Subsequently, on 25January, 
1812 Abbott moved for a new trial on the Duchess’s behalf but was rebuffed. Lord Ellenborough 
reiterated that Lord Mansfield’s doctrine in Corbett v. Poelnitz ‘had been since overset’. Also, ‘it 
appeared that Lord Kenyon was wrong in his prophecy’ that the Duke had deserted the kingdom, and 
if the plaintiff were permitted to prevail, ‘it would sanction the arrest of every married woman whose 
husband should go abroad upon the service of his country’. 
 
Necessaries and the Tradesmen's Dilemma 
 
 As has by now become obvious, the position of the tradesmen and merchants who dealt with 
women customers was delicate. Outside the confines of the City of London, extending credit to 
women who presented themselves as femes sole was risky business. After Marshall v. Rutton, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  (1811)	  3	  Camp	  123.	  
	  
71	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  Walford	  v.	  de	  Pienne	  and	  Franks	  v.	  De	  Pienne,	  text	  at	  nn.	  38-­‐9,	  above.	  
	  
72	  3	  Camp	  123.	  
	  
73	  Ibid.	   at	  124-­‐5.	  According	   to	  The	  Times,	  6	  December	  1811,	  3,	   Lord	  Ellenborough	  said	   that	   Lord	  Mansfield’s	  
Corbett	  doctrine	  ‘had	  been	  completely	  exploded’.	  
	  
74	  Ibid.	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were very few situations that would permit the merchants to recover judgments against married 
women, even when the husbands were beyond reach or could not be held liable. One semi-safe 
harbour, however, was when the goods sold or services rendered appeared to be ‘necessaries’, for 
which husbands would ordinarily be responsible. Yet even these situations were uncertain. Did the 
customer live with her husband in marital contentment, such that all transactions would be the 
husband’s responsibility? Or would her husband’s implied consent extend only to ‘necessaries’, and if 
so, what goods and services did the wife’s ‘station in life’ encompass as ‘necessaries’? How was the 
appropriate ‘station in life’ to be determined? Did the financial condition of the husband matter? If the 
husband and wife lived separately, did the wife have a separate allowance?  If so, was her allowance 
adequate to support the station in life to which she was entitled? These and other such questions 
bombarded the judges. 
 In an unreported 1787 nisi prius case tried by Buller JKB, Shepherd v. Smith,75 a creditor sued 
for payment for necessaries provided to the defendant’s wife. The defence was that the wife had left 
of her own accord and had behaved very improperly (‘she had sometimes been in liquor and raised 
broils in the street’). The plaintiff replied that prior to the wife’s leaving, the defendant had behaved 
badly toward her, for example by keeping his mistress in the house. Buller J instructed the jury as 
follows:  
The law is thus. If a woman wilfully and without any reasonable cause leaves her husband’s 
house and lives elsewhere without his consent, there he is not liable for any debts which she 
may contract. But if he thrusts her out of doors, or acts in such a manner as renders it 
impossible for her to continue under the same roof, as by keeping a mistress under her nose, 
there he sends her out with a credit upon all the world, for such things as are necessary for a 
person in a situation of life which he himself holds and he is liable for so much.76  
Accordingly, the jury found for the plaintiff. 
 As Buller J stated, the level of support to which the wife was entitled was to be measured by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75Buller	  and	  East,	  Misc.	  MS	  97,	  132v,	  sittings	  after	  Easter	  Term,	  1787,	  Westminster	  Hall.	  	  
	  
76	  Ibid.	  at	  132v-­‐133.	  Buller	  ‘also	  added	  that	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  if	  he	  wishes	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  her	  credit,	  he	  must	  
apply	  to	  her	  to	  come	  back	  and	  live	  with	  him’.	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the husband’s ‘situation in life’. Put another way, there was a clear recognition by the judges that 
husbands were to be protected against spendthrift wives, provided that husbands did their best to keep 
their wives under control.  The report in The Times of the 1793 case of Dyde v. Bewicke began as 
follows: ‘This is an action of the greatest importance to every husband in the kingdom, who has the 
misfortune to have an extravagant wife, to all haberdashers, milleners, and to tradesmen in general’.77 
The defendant was a clergyman. Erskine, in the clergyman’s defence, said that it seemed to be 
presumed by the plaintiffs that a husband was responsible for whatever his wife might chuse to 
purchase’, but ‘could this authority possibly cover two cloaks (accounting for more than half of the 
plaintiffs’ bill) that could not without disgrace be worn by the wife of a person of a degree no higher 
than this clergyman’? Lord Kenyon understood the point. He said that ‘if this Bill was to be supported 
up to its full extent, there was no person in the kingdom almost, however low his degree in life might 
be, who might not, in a few months, be called upon to answer for contracts made by his wife up to an 
extent that might ruin him’. Kenyon admitted that, ‘One was sorry that tradesmen of reputation should 
be losers, but when they carried their goods to market, they ought to carry common-sense and 
common prudence along with them and ought to have made enquiry who this woman was’.78 The jury 
‘immediately found a verdict for the defendant’. 
 Likewise in Dawson v. Gildert, a clergyman defendant was held not responsible for his wife’s 
purchase of millenary articles. Erskine, for the defendant, described the wife as ‘in the wane of 
beauty’ but ‘still retaining the most passionate fondness for splendor of dress’. After paying one bill to 
the plaintiff, the defendant had ‘strictly enjoined her [the plaintiff] not to give his wife any further 
credit’. Lord Kenyon said that if the plaintiff were to recover her demand ‘after she had received the 
notice not to trust the Lady, there could be no domestic security’ – the clergyman was only ‘bound to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  The	  Times,	  2	  July	  1793,	  3.	  
	  
78	  The	   action	  was	   brought	   to	   recover	   on	   a	   bill	   for	   £92.15s.9d.	   The	   clergyman’s	   annual	   income	  was	   £230	   to	  
£250.	   A	   witness	   for	   the	   defendant,	   Miss	   Foster,	   was	   in	   the	   shop	   when	   the	   defendant’s	   wife	   made	   her	  
purchases.	  Miss	  Foster	  said	   that	   the	  wife	   ‘appeared	  to	  be	  a	   lady	  of	   fashion,	  and	  spoke	  to	  Lady	  Hawke,	  Lady	  
Turner,	  Lady	  Say	  and	  Sele,	  and	  to	  other	  ladies	  of	  fashion,	  as	  if	  she	  had	  been	  acquainted	  with	  them’.	  Miss	  Foster	  
‘thought	   it	   would	   have	   been	   rude	   and	   impertinent	   to	   have	   asked	   the	   defendant’s	   lady	  who	   she	  was’.	   This	  
testimony	  provoked	  sarcastic	  commentary	  by	  Erskine:	   ‘When	  a	  woman	  was	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  woman	  of	   fashion	  
after	   she	   had	   been	   rigged	   out	   in	   one	   shop,	   she	  might	   go	   in	   full	   sail	   into	   another;	   and	   if	   she	   spoke	   to	   Lady	  
Hawke,	  Lady	  Say	  and	  Sele,	  or	  any	  other	  Lady	  of	  Fashion	  about	  gauze,	  ribbons,	  pads,	  or	  any	  other	  fashionable	  
commodity,	  she	  herself	  forsooth	  was	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  woman	  of	  fashion	  also’:	  Ibid.	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pay the debts of his wife which were contracted for articles consonant with his rank in life’.79 
 On occasion, a wife would resort to stealth and deception. In Bentley v. Griffin,80 the 
plaintiffs, dressmakers, sought payment for fashionable dresses furnished to the defendant’s wife. The 
defendant and his wife lived together; he was an attorney who depended on his modest practice for 
income. His wife borrowed a friend’s curricle to convey her in style to the plaintiff’s shop and later 
instructed the servants to put the dresses away so that her husband might not see them. Against the 
instructions of the trial judge (Heath J), the jury awarded the plaintiff the full £183 demanded, 
prompting a subsequent motion by Serjeant Best to set aside the verdict. In opposition, Serjeant 
Vaughan cited ‘the doctrine of Ellenborough C.J. in the case of Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Campb. 
120, that however low a man’s circumstances may be, if he allows his wife to assume an appearance 
which he is unable to support, he is answerable for the consequences’.81 Heath, Chambré, and Dallas 
JJ, however, thought the verdict wrong (‘grossly wrong’, according to Chambré) and ordered a new 
trial.82 The second jury returned a verdict of only £15.15s., ‘the price of a black dress, which it 
appeared the husband had seen her try on’.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  The	  Times,	  1	  December	  1801,	  3.	  
	  
80	  (1814)	  5	  Taunt	  356.	  
	  
81	  Ibid.	  at	  537.	  
	  
82	  5	  Taunt	  358;	  see	  also	  The	  Times,	  12	  February	  1814,	  2.	  
	  
83	  The	  Times,	  30	  May	  1814,	  2.	  This	  outcome	  corresponded	  to	  views	  not	  only	  of	  the	  Common	  Pleas	  judges	  but	  
also	   to	  predecessor	   judges	  on	   the	  courts	  of	  Exchequer	  and	  King’s	  Bench.	  A	  notebook	  originally	  belonging	   to	  
Edward	  Clive	   (JCP	   1753-­‐70),	   passed	  on	   to	  Buller	   J,	   then	   given	  by	  Buller	   shortly	   before	  his	   death	   to	   Soulden	  
Lawrence	  (JCP	  1794,	  1808-­‐12;	  JKB	  1794-­‐1808)	  contains	  the	  following	  case	  note:	  
Baker	  v.	  Baker	  at	  the	  sittings	  at	  Guildhall	  11	  Feb	  1726	  Coram	  Pengally	  Ch[ief]	  Baron-­‐-­‐he	  cited	  the	  Case	  
of	  Keniston	  v.	  Beau	  Goodall	  of	  Grays	  Inn,	  which	  was	  tryed	  before	  Holt	  Ch[ief]	  J[usti]ce.	  The	  case	  was	  
Michaelmas	  1705.	  A	  Tradesman	  brought	  an	  action	  against	  the	  husband	  for	  money	  due	  to	  him	  for	  the	  
price	  of	   some	   fine	   cloaths,	  which	   the	  wife	  had	  bought	  of	   the	  plaintiff,	   unknown	   to	   the	  husband.	   It	  
appeared	  upon	  evidence	  that	  during	  the	  time	  of	  a	  constant	  cohabitation,	  the	  wife,	  without	  the	  privity	  
of	  the	  defendant	  her	  husband	  had	  bought	  a	  rich	  suit	  of	  apparel	  &	  carryed	  them	  to	  a	  friend’s	  house,	  
where	   she	   dressed,	   went	   to	   plays,	   operas,	   &	   other	   places	   of	   publick	   resort,	   and	   when	   these	  
amusements	  were	   finished,	   she	  undressed	   at	   her	   friend’s	   house	  &	   returned	   to	   her	   husband	   in	   her	  
usual	  dress.	  And	  the	  question	  was	  how	  far	  the	  husband	  was	  chargeable	  to	  pay	  the	  plaintiff	  for	  these	  
cloaths.	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  Holt	  held	  he	  was	  not	  chargeable	  at	  all	  because	  they	  never	  came	  to	  his	  eye,	  
because	  the	  secret	  manner	  in	  which	  she	  dressed	  &	  used	  the	  cloaths	  entirely	  disengag’d	  the	  husband	  
from	  any	  presumption	   that	   he	   consented	   to	   the	  buying	  of	   them;	  neither	   could	   they	  be	   reasonably	  
comprised	  under	  the	  notion	  of	  such	  necessary	  cloathing	  every	  husband	  is	  obliged	  to	  afford	  his	  wife,	  
and	  therefore	  he	  ought	  not	  to	  pay	  for	  them.	  But	  held	  it	  would	  have	  altered	  the	  case	  greatly	  if	  it	  had	  
appear’d	  she	  had	  ever	  worn	  the	  cloaths	  in	  her	  husband’s	  company.	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 Lord Ellenborough in Waithman v. Wakefield did indeed say that a husband was answerable 
for improvident purchases by his wife if the husband adopts her actions by failing to control her, even 
if the wife is ‘unmanageable and disobedient’.84 But he also said that ‘it is the duty of tradesmen to 
make enquiries before trusting a married woman who is a stranger to them’.85 The defendant in 
Waithman was a young attorney, recently called to the bar, who had married while a law student. His 
wife turned out to have a violent temper, reducing her husband to a state of misery. According to a 
newspaper report of the case, the defendant’s counsel, Attorney General Vicary Gibbs, called the wife 
one of the most notorious swindlers that ever infested this city – ‘Nothing could exceed the art which 
the family of Mrs. Wakefield exhibited in carrying on their nefarious practices’.86 Ellenborough told 
the jury that since the plaintiffs trusted the defendant’s wife without making any inquiry about her, ‘if 
they receive a verdict at all, their demand should be reduced to the charge for necessaries suitable to 
the circumstances of the defendant’.87 But the jury, ‘notwithstanding gave the plaintiffs a verdict for 
the full sum of £34.13s’.88  
 The ‘necessaries’ cases reflect the marital mores of the time that called for wives to be 
subservient and financially prudent. Wives who misbehaved could not expect much sympathy from 
the courts, though this depended in some measure on the nature of the misbehaviour. Wives on 
shopping sprees seem trivial compared to another situation that generated claims against husbands to 
cover necessaries supplied to wives, namely, when the wife fled the marital home. Here, the reason 
for the wife’s departure was important.  Buller J in Shepherd v. Smith said that a wife would retain her 
right to necessaries if she left home because her husband had made her continuation under the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See	  [Treatise	  on	  Nisi	  Prius	  law],	  MS	  41,	  Middle	  Temple	  Library,	  London,	  part	  3	  (Nisi	  Prius	  determinations),	  4-­‐5.	  
	  
84	  1	  Camp	  at	  121.	  
	  
85	  Ibid.	  at	  122.	  
	  
86	  The	  Times,	  21	  December	  1807,	  3.	  Apparently	  Mrs	  Wakefield	  enlisted	  her	  father,	  brother,	  and	  cousin	  in	  her	  
schemes.	  
	  
87	  1	  Camp	  at	  122.	  
	  
88	  Ibid.	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roof intolerable, as by keeping a mistress under her nose. 89 A decade later, Lord Kenyon CJ in 
Hodges v. Hodges90 reframed the critical inquiry. The defendant’s wife, after being beaten repeatedly 
by him, took the young children and went to live with her adult son, the plaintiff, who provided board 
and lodging and funds for education expenses.91 The plaintiff sued the husband in assumpsit for 
recompense. Lord Kenyon could not get the parties to agree to arbitration, but he finally coaxed them 
to settle. According to Peake’s report, Kenyon said that ‘the case itself would be attended with 
difficulty in point of law, and complete justice could not be done’. He gave the following explanation:  
If a husband turned his wife out of doors he sent a credit with her; and . . . he [Lord Kenyon] 
was inclined to . . . say, that if he [the husband] behaved in such a way as to render it unsafe 
and dangerous for her to reside with him, that in that case the plaintiff would be entitled to 
recover [from the husband] for the board of the wife; further he could not go, for the wife 
might apply to the Spiritual Court for a divorce’.92  
 There was a sharp difference between the formulation of the basic rule by Buller J in 
Shepherd and that by Lord Kenyon in Hodges. It was one thing for the wife to be unable to continue 
under the same roof because of her husband’s beastly behaviour, but quite another to require that it be 
‘unsafe and dangerous’ for the wife to remain. 
Kenyon’s successor, Lord Ellenborough, appears to have been more in line with Buller than 
with Kenyon. In Brannan v. Dodds,93 the plaintiff had supplied board and lodging to the defendant’s 
wife, and the plaintiff’s counsel argued that the defendant was responsible for his wife’s expenses 
whenever the husband’s maltreatment rendered ‘her stay in his family dangerous to life or limb, or 
destructive of her peace’, causing the wife to take refuge elsewhere. Agreeing, Lord Ellenborough 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Quoted	  above,	  text	  at	  n.	  76.	  
	  
90	  (1796)	  Peake	  Add	  Cas	  79,	  also	  reported	  at	  1	  Esp	  441.	  	  
	  
91	  The	  defendant	  was	  apparently	  the	  plaintiff’s	  father,	  based	  on	  Lord	  Kenyon’s	  reference	  to	  ‘the	  near	  degree	  of	  
relationship’	  between	  the	  parties.	  	  
	  
92	  Peake	   Add.	   Cas.	   79.	   Kenyon	   also	   said	   that	   there	   was	   nothing	   he	   could	   do	   for	   the	   children–that	   the	   law	  
obliged	  the	  defendant	  ‘to	  nothing	  but	  nurture,	  which	  duty	  expired	  when	  the	  child	  reached	  the	  age	  of	  seven’,	  
Ibid.	  at	  80.	  	  
	  
93	  The	  Times,	  29	  February	  1804,	  3.	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instructed the jury that if the wife ‘experienced such brutal treatment as to render it impossible for her 
to live with her husband, then she had a right to get credit upon his account for the necessaries of life’. 
The jury verdict was for the plaintiff for £15.13s.1d. 
Yet Lord Kenyon’s harsher version of the basic rule prevailed for many years in the Court of 
Common Pleas. In Horwood v. Heffer,94 the husband (the defendant) was held not to be liable for 
necessaries supplied to his wife despite his despicable behaviour toward her. He had ‘taken another 
woman into the house, with whom he cohabited’, and ‘had confined his wife in her chamber under a 
pretence of insanity’. The wife escaped, and the suit was for necessaries furnished to her afterwards. 
At trial, Lawrence J nonsuited the plaintiff because there was no proof of the wife’s ‘apprehension of 
her personal safety’, and ‘however abhorrent from the feelings of a delicate woman, she might 
nevertheless have had necessaries, if she had staid there. She might, if she had thought fit, have sued 
for alimony, and a divorce a mensâ et thoro’.95 The nonsuit was upheld by the Court of Common 
Pleas. Preserving jurisdictional boundaries, Sir James Mansfield CJ declared: ‘If this suit were 
maintainable, it would be necessary that the jury should, in the first place, determine whether the wife 
lawfully left her home or not; this would wholly supersede the necessity of a suit for alimony, or a 
divorce a mensâ et thoro. I think nothing short of actual terror and violence will support this action’.96  
 Counsel for the plaintiff in Horwood was William Best. In 1818, Best became a King’s Bench 
judge, and in 1824 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. The following year 
the case of Houliston v. Smyth97 came before the Common Pleas with facts quite similar to those in 
Horwood. The plaintiff in Houliston sued for the use and occupation of rooms and for necessaries 
furnished to the defendant’s wife. The defendant had abused his wife, even for a time confining her to 
a private madhouse. The wife eventually could take no more and left. At trial, Best CJ said that, ‘A 
man in the plaintiff’s situation cannot recover, unless the wife be at his house with the assent of the 
husband, or unless the husband drives her from her home by cruelty, personal violence, or that which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  (1811)	  3	  Taunt.	  421.	  	  
	  
95	  Ibid.	  at	  422.	  	  
	  
96	  Ibid.	  
	  	  
97	  (1825)	  2	  Car	  &	  P	  22.	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shall excite reasonable fear of personal violence, for in such case he sends her out with a general 
credit’.98 As to Horwood v. Heffer, Best declared, ‘I was dissatisfied with the decision at the time, and 
have continued so ever since; and if this case had come to that point, I had determined to have it 
reconsidered’.99  
 Serjeant Vaughan then took the case before the full Court of Common Pleas on a motion for 
new trial, and notwithstanding Best CJ’s comments at trial, cited Horwood v. Heffer on the 
defendant’s behalf. Best interrupted Vaughan to ask whether he was aware ‘of a late case [Aldis v. 
Chapman] in which Lord Ellenborough at N.P. [nisi prius] expressly overruled Horwood v. 
Heffer?’100 Best said that if he had known about the Aldis case at trial, he ‘would have ruled that 
Horwood v. Heffer was not law, it being against the first principles of morality’. Park J emphatically 
agreed, asking, ‘Is the mistress of a family to give way to a common prostitute?’ Park expressed 
surprise at the language of Horwood, declaring: ‘Taken to its full extent, it is abhorrent to every 
feeling of a man, and every duty of a moralist and a Christian; for it is said, that although a husband 
places a profligate woman at the head of his table, and tells his wife that she may dine in her own 
room, yet she is not justified in quitting his house, but should sue for alimony or a divorce a mensâ et 
thoro’.101 
 In cases where the wife was shown to have eloped with a lover or to be living separately in 
adultery, the husband’s responsibility for his wife customarily ended. Unsurprisingly, Lord Kenyon 
hated to dirty his hands with these cases. In Gilchrist v. Brown, the defendant, on being sued as a feme 
sole, pleaded coverture, to which the plaintiff replied that the defendant had left her husband and was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Ibid.	  at	  27.	  Best’s	  statement	  of	  the	  basic	  rule	  closely	  resembles	  that	  of	  Buller	  J	  in	  Shepherd	  v.	  Smith,	  text	  at	  n.	  
76,	  above.	  
	  
99	  Ibid.	  at	  28.	  	  
	  
100	  Ibid.	   at	   29.	   The	   Aldis	   case,	   decided	   at	   the	   Middlesex	   sittings	   after	   Trinity	   Term	   1810,	   was	   apparently	  
unreported	   except	   for	   a	   one-­‐sentence	   description	   in	   Selwyn’s	  Nisi	   Prius	   (W.	   Selwyn,	   The	   Law	   of	  Nisi	   Prius	  
(London,	  1823),	  vol.	  I,	  207).	  
	  
101	  Ibid.	  at	  30-­‐31.	  Burrough	  and	  Gazelee	  JJ	  concurred.	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living separately in adultery. 102 The court asked counsel for the plaintiff whether there was any 
precedent to support her replication, and on being told that ‘there was no case precisely similar’, 
immediately ruled for the defendant, because there was no separate maintenance (as there had been, 
for example, in Corbett).  
In Govier v. Hancock,103 the prevailing double standard for husbands and wives was exhibited 
with shocking clarity. There, the plaintiff sued for necessaries furnished to the defendant’s wife. The 
defendant had previously ‘treated his wife with great cruelty’, having brought his mistress to live in 
the house and eventually turning his wife out of doors.104 Later, the wife committed adultery herself, 
living with another man for a time, but after he left her, she incurred the expenses for which the suit 
was brought. The court said that the governing principle was ‘that the husband is not liable in cases 
where the wife goes away with an adulterer’.105 When counsel for the plaintiff pointed out that the 
expenses had been incurred when the wife was no longer living in adultery, Lord Kenyon was 
unimpressed. He said that in order to learn what the law was on whether a man was obliged to take 
back his wife after she had been living in adultery with another man, ‘it was as clear as the sun’ – ‘it 
was only necessary to consult one’s feelings’.106 The plaintiff was nonsuited.  
 In the context of adulterous behavior, Lord Kenyon CJ and Buller J, yet again, showed 
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  (1792)	   4	   TR	   766.	   The	   defendant	  was	   said	   to	   be	   living	   ‘in	   adultery’	   despite	   having	   apparently	   received	   a	  
divorce	  a	  mensa	  et	  thoro.	  
	  
103	  (1796)	  6	  TR	  603.	  
	  
104	  Hancock	  reportedly	  brought	  into	  his	  house	  not	  only	  his	  mistress	  (a	  married	  woman)	  but	  also	  two	  children	  
Hancock	  had	  by	  her:	  The	  Times,	  15	  April	  1796,	  3.	  
	  
105	  6	  TR	  at	  604.	  	  
	  
106	  The	  Times,	  15	  April	  1796,	  3.	  To	  add	  insult	  to	  injury,	  the	  court	  noted	  that,	  ‘if	  the	  wife	  had	  instituted	  a	  suit	  in	  
the	   Ecclesiastical	   Court	   against	   the	   husband	   for	   restitution	   of	   conjugal	   rights,	   they	  would	   not	   have	   assisted	  
her’:	  6	  TR	  at	  604.	  The	  result	  reached	  in	  the	  case	  could	  place	  the	  wife	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  receive	  any	  
further	  credit,	  even	   for	  necessaries.	  Apparently	  Lord	  Kenyon	  was	  unconcerned	  about	  whether	  an	  adulteress	  
might	  be	  starved,	  no	  matter	  how	  insufferable	  the	  husband’s	  behaviour	  had	  been	  before	  he	  threw	  his	  wife	  out	  
of	   the	   house.	   (Compare	   Kenyon’s	   comments	   in	   the	   Duchess	   of	   Pienne	   cases,	   nn.	   38-­‐39,	   above,	   and	  
accompanying	  text.)	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  author,	  these	  cases	  tested	  whether	  there	  were	  “moral,	  physical,	  and	  
legal	   limits	   to	  what	  a	  wife	   should	  endure:”	   S.	   Lloyd,	   ‘Amour	   in	   the	  Shrubbery:	  Reading	   the	  Detail	   of	   English	  
Adultery	  Trial	  Publications	  of	  the	  1780s’,	  (2006)	  39	  Eighteenth-­‐Century	  Studies	  421,	  426.	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sharply contrasting philosophies. In Norton v. Fazen,107 the defendant was the cuckolded husband 
who left home after discovering his wife’s adultery. The Court of Common Pleas held the defendant 
liable for necessaries supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant’s wife and children because there was 
no proof that the wife’s affair was known to the plaintiff or was so notorious that it should have been 
known. Buller J said that the case was anomalous; nevertheless: 
The wife committed adultery for a considerable time while she was living with her husband; 
he voluntarily yielded his bed to the adulterer, and made no provision for her. Then what 
colour of defence is left? Knowing of her criminal conduct and having made no provision for 
her, he must maintain her as before.108 
  Other judges, like Buller J, were not fettered by the strict moral code that governed Lord 
Kenyon. In the Houliston case, Serjeant Vaughan, counsel for the defendant, offered to prove the 
wife’s adultery. At nisi prius, Best CJ rejected the proof, stating: ‘The receiving such evidence might 
give the husband, in some cases, the liberty to take advantage of his own profligacy, as he might have 
driven her to such behaviour by his bad conduct’.109  
 
Conclusion 
 The Court of King’s Bench in Marshall v. Rutton (1800), under Kenyon CJ, overruled earlier 
King’s Bench decisions by Lord Mansfield that had allowed creditors to prevail in suits against 
married women in an expanding set of factual circumstances. As Kenyon confessed in Marshall, he 
had never been satisfied with the Mansfield decisions, and had wished that a case ‘should come to 
take away all the difficulties’. The Marshall case fulfilled his wish. Kenyon, however, was not the 
powerful leader of King’s Bench that Mansfield had been, and but for fortuities of judicial turnover, 
the turnabout in Marshall might not have happened.  
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  (1798)	  1	  B	  &	  P	  226.	  
	  
108	  1	  B	  &	  P	  at	  227.	  Eyre	  CJ	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  defendant,	  observing	  that	   if	   the	  defendant	  could	   ‘bring	   it	  
home	  to	  any	  other	  tradesman	  who	  shall	  be	  in	  the	  same	  situation	  as	  the	  present	  Plaintiff,	  that	  he	  did	  know	  or	  
ought	  to	  have	  known	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  the	  wife	  was	  living,	  the	  Defendant	  may	  perhaps	  be	  able	  
to	  prevent	  another	  verdict	  passing	  against	  him’.	  	  
	  
109	  2	  Car	  &	  P	  at	  23-­‐24.	  
28	  
The fact that newly appointed judges find ways to effect change while pretending to honor 
stare decisis is hardly surprising. It is nonetheless important where possible to make the historical 
record transparent. Lawrence J’s manuscripts allow us to see behind the curtain in the influential case 
of Marshall v. Rutton.  
The moral high ground occupied by Lord Kenyon on the subject of marriage was shared by 
other common law judges of the time, and the creditors who assumed or who were duped into 
thinking that they were dealing with femes sole were often left unrecompensed. After Marshall, this 
occurred whenever the wife was the defendant and she could prove her coverture, except in the rare 
cases when the husband was out of the country in circumstances that could be said to be equivalent to 
civil death. And even if the husband could be found in England and sued, he could not be held liable – 
not even for necessaries – if the wife left the home ‘willfully and without any reasonable cause’,110 
most commonly when she eloped in adultery with a lover. 
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  Buller	  J	  in	  Shepherd	  v.	  Smith,	  text	  at	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  above.	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APPENDIX 
 
Harris v. Pyne 
 
Information about this unreported case, tried at the Devon summer assizes in 1788, can be found in 
the brief sent to Serjeant Soulden Lawrence, now part of the Dampier Manuscripts in Lincoln’s Inn 
Library, London. (See Edmund Heward, ‘The Dampier Manuscripts at Lincoln’s Inn’ (1988) 9 
Journal of Legal History 357.) The brief is no. VIII in a box misleadingly labeled ‘Dampier Briefs’. 
Most of the briefs within were those of Serjeant Lawrence during his years of active practice before 
the Court of Common Pleas, 1787-94, after he was made Serjeant-at-Law in Hilary Term 1787. (His 
practice previously had been predominantly in the Court of King’s Bench. He was made a junior 
Justice of Common Pleas on 8 March 1794.) The issue in Harris v. Pyne (quoted in n. 49, above) is in 
Lawrence’s handwriting beside the caption on the folded brief that was sent to Lawrence for a fee of 
three guineas. On the reverse sides of the pages of the brief are Lawrence’s notes of arguments of 
counsel and of the opinion by Eyre CJ.  
According to the brief, the plaintiff, a widow, married Edward Harris in 1784 after a marriage 
settlement had been executed, dated 13 November 1784. Two years later, the marriage failed, and the 
plaintiff on 9 December 1786 moved out, commencing divorce proceedings on 26 January 1787 for 
cruelty. Mr Harris then preferred at the quarter sessions an indictment against his wife for assault, 
which was removed to the Court of King’s Bench, coming on for trial at the Lent Assizes 1787.  The 
dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was issued, ordering among other things that Mr and 
Mrs Harris were to live separate and apart from each other. 
The plaintiff in her brief itemised the contents (clothing and household linens) packed in two 
boxes and two trunks that were by contract to be carried by the defendant from Topsham to 
Alphington, where the plaintiff had taken up residence. The plaintiff alleged that Pyne the carrier (the 
defendant), in collusion with Mr Harris, allowed the carriage to be stopped on the King’s highway in 
Alphington, after which the boxes and trunks were removed and released to Mr Harris. The principal 
parts of Eyre CJ’s opinion, as noted down by Serjeant Lawrence, were as follows: 
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This is a new case. I should be sorry to lay down a rule to facilitate married women living 
separate. I doubt if Courts of Justice have not gone too far. The first case proceeded on an 
apparent necessity.111 I do not at all wonder that when the consequences of the first 
determinations were seen that it was found necessary to go further – and when she was held 
liable for necessaries, I see no good reason for stopping short of all contracts – and therefore 
I do not think the last case wrong if the first [was] right.  
This [case] however is going one step further – this involves the question  
if the husband has divested himself of his rights in the wife’s property. And if the husband 
has not divested himself, the delivery is good.   
The situation of a feme sole liable to be sued must be presumed to arise out of the 
contract of separation; so [also] her power to contract – for if she separated voluntarily, she 
could not contract. Without trustees, I do not think an agreement before marriage could 
enable a woman to hold her property separately. [An] order of nisi prius112 may be as good a 
way to live separate – [it] may be as good a way as any – but no provision [is] there as to the 
property of the wife. All I presume the courts thought necessary to look to as to separate 
maintenance was to see that she had something to live on.  
Here I shall incorporate the original settlement with the order of separation, just as if 
it was provided for in the Act of Separation. What are to be the consequences of the contract 
for a separate maintenance must be determined from the terms of the contract. It has been 
rightly asked, does it apply to after-acquired property? . . .113 
I choose to determine this on the general ground – that nothing should prevent a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Undoubtedly	  Eyre	  was	  referring	  to	  Ringsted	  v.	  Lady	  Lanesborough,	  text	  at	  nn.	  13-­‐16,	  above.	  
	  
112	  Here	   Eyre	   CJ	   is	   referring	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   arbitration	   award	   ordering	   Mr	   and	   Mrs	   Harris	   to	   live	  
separately	  had	  been	  made	  a	  rule	  of	  court,	  i.e.,	  an	  order	  by	  the	  trial	  court	  (an	  ‘order	  of	  nisi	  prius’).	  
	  
113	  Gibbs	  here	   stated	   the	  case	  of	  Haslington	   v.	  Gill	   [3	  Doug.	  415	   (1784)],	   in	  which	   the	  Court	  of	  King’s	  Bench	  
upheld	  a	  marriage	  settlement	  assigning	  to	  trustees	  a	  herd	  of	  cows	  for	  the	  wife’s	  separate	  use,	  and	  the	  court	  
allowed	  the	  profits	  and	  produce	  from	  the	  cows	  during	  the	  marriage	  to	  be	   included.	  Eyre	  CJ	  responded,	   ‘I	  do	  
not	  quarrel	  with	  that.	  It	  was	  a	  trading	  stock’.	  Gibbs	  then	  attempted	  an	  analogy	  –	  ‘The	  wearing	  apparel	  must	  be	  
the	  produce	  of	  the	  separate	  property’	  –	  but	  Eyre	  CJ	  then	  stated	  his	  resolution	  of	  the	  case.	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husband receiving from a carrier. Had this been the case of wearing apparel only, I might 
perhaps have been of opinion with the lady. My opinion is that two boxes, contents 
unknown, delivered to the carrier and afterwards to the husband is a good delivery.  
 
Although the case was not one ‘of wearing apparel only’, the Declaration itemised the contents of the 
boxes and trunks, and in addition to household goods, wares, cloth, and linens, the following clothes 
were listed: ‘1 bombazine gown and petticoat, 1 black silk gown & petticoat, 1 black satin quilted 
petticoat, 2 black silk aprons, 2 black silk handkerchiefs, 3 black silk mode cloths, 3 chintz gowns, 1 
striped Holland gown & petticoat,’. These clothes, plus ‘100 yards of black lace, 100 yards of 
trimmings, 100 yards of bone lace’, were characterised in the Declaration as ‘necessary wearing 
apparel of Plaintiff’s of large value, to wit of the value of 100£’. 
	  
